By Stephanie Graban, Senior Africa Analyst
Figure 1: Sudanese Refugees in the Chadian border town of Adre, January 2025.
Introduction
Long overlooked while its neighbours were impacted by protracted civil wars, Chad remains a mystery to many. As the Daily Express put it in February: “Africa’s 5th biggest country that you almost never see on the news.” (i) The central African country may soon find itself in the limelight as regional powers vie for influence. Since 2023, Chadian President Mahamat Déby Itno has pivoted from decades of alignment with the West and former coloniser France to courting the UAE, Russia, and Turkey.(ii)
With global powers increasingly recognising Chad’s strategic importance, Chad now serves as a strategic battleground as Déby juggles autonomy, security partnerships, and economic deals. Yet, this balancing act carries risks: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have accused Chad of abetting UAE arms transfers to its rival in the Sudanese civil war, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). With refugees moving to Chad in growing numbers and violent extremism proliferating on Chad’s borders, the partnerships N’Djamena forges with foreign nations could shape the stability of the entire central African region.
The Chadian arms corridor to Sudan’s RSF
Open-source data and UN investigators paint a clear picture: Abu Dhabi has established a “new regional air bridge” through Chad to arm Sudan’s in their war against the SAF. Since this war began, dozens of UAE-linked Il‑76 cargo flights have touched down at Chad’s Amdjarass airport (near Darfur) and N’Djamena (iii), UN experts report that these flights carried drones, missiles, and ammo destined for the RSF. N’Djamena and Abu Dhabi insist the cargoes for Sudan were humanitarian aid, but Khartoum’s SAF is convinced otherwise – and has publicly threatened Chad in response. In March 2025, Sudan’s SAF Deputy Commander Lt-Gen Yasir al-Atta publicly declared Chad’s Amdjarass and N’Djamena airports as legitimate targets, accusing Chad of facilitating UAE-backed drone attacks on Darfur.(v) N’Djamena has vehemently denied plotting any strikes and called Atta’s statement a “declaration of war,” but the allegations underscore how significant Khartoum consider Chad’s role in the conflict to be.(vi)
Deepening UAE-Chad ties
Military support has been matched by expanding economic and diplomatic links. In May 2025, Chad and the UAE (through the UAE’s state-owned Etihad Rail) signed a landmark MoU on the long-planned Chad–Cameroon railway, a multimodal corridor to the Atlantic,(vii) aiming to connect landlocked Chad’s resources to global markets. High-level visits underscore this cooperation: in November 2024, UAE Minister Shakhboot bin Nahyan flew to N’Djamena and “reaffirmed… broadening cooperation in key sectors” (infrastructure, trade, energy), with Emirati development dollars likely to follow.(viii) Chad’s new national plan, titled “Chad Connection 2030” – launched in Abu Dhabi – seeks to raise $30 billion in development investments.(ix) The UAE is expected to bid on several projects in the oil, mining, and construction sectors.
Figure 2: Place de la Nation in N’Djamena.
Chad’s balancing act with Russia
Alongside Gulf ties, Chad has reopened the door to Moscow. In January 2024, President Déby traveled to Moscow and met Vladimir Putin. Putin praised Chad’s stabilisation efforts and spoke of doubling educational exchanges. In June 2024, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov concluded an African tour in N’Djamena, assuring Déby that friendship with Russia “will not affect” Chad’s ties with historical ally France(x) This diplomatic outreach is no accident: Russia seeks to erode French influence in Africa, and Chad appears open to new security partners beyond its erstwhile patron. Simultaneously, Chad’s location makes it of growing strategic interest to Moscow. As Russian military and Wagner-linked actors entrench themselves in south-eastern Libya (on Chad’s northern border) and secure access to Tobruk port, Chad could offer a vital land corridor to the Sahel, where Russia has already established a presence. A corridor through Chad would facilitate logistical continuity from the Mediterranean to the heart of Sahelian West Africa.
Yet N’Djamena’s drift toward Moscow has clear limits. In late 2024, Chad detained a group of Russians and Belarusians (including a prominent Wagner-linked operative, Maxim Shugaley) on arrival at N’Djamena airport.(xi) All were quietly released back to Russia after Chad maintained that the arrests were legitimate – though it offered no official explanation for them.(xii) More strikingly, in March 2025, Chad jailed three local journalists on charges of spying for Wagner.(xiii) Those moves send a signal: Chad wants Russian aid, but does not want a Wagner foothold at home. Déby has also told France and the U.S. that he intends to build a “more autonomous” army, abolishing legacy Western bases, while inviting Western trainers back under new terms.(xiv) In short, Chad is trying to have it both ways – “balancing” between Russia and the West.
Figure 3: Guelta d’Archeï, North-Eastern Chad
Erdoğan’s gambit
Turkey has rapidly expanded its military footprint in Chad to fill the vacuum left by France’s military withdrawal in late 2024.(xv) In January 2025, Ankara secured an agreement to control of the Abéché military base in eastern Chad – formerly a French counterterrorism hub. This move was complemented by the deployment of Turkish drones and military advisors to the Faya-Largeau base near the Libyan border, enhancing Chad’s surveillance and defense capabilities in volatile border regions.(xvi) By providing advanced military equipment – including Bayraktar drones and aircraft – and offering training to Chadian forces, Ankara appears invested in bolstering Chad’s security capabilities.(xvii) This engagement is likely part of a broader strategy to increase Turkey’s regional security presence and protect its interests in Libya.(xviii)
Last but not least… China?
In April 2025, Chad announced it had received Chinese FK‑2000 mobile air-defense systems from the UAE.(xix) This unprecedented shipment – two truck-mounted SAM units with missiles and ammunition – signals emerging influence from Beijing. Chad says the delivery came under a 2023 UAE–Chad military pact; UAE sources confirm it was bought from China and flown via Abu Dhabi.(xx) (xxi) By channeling arms transfers through proxies, Beijing may hope to gain strategic access without the direct visibility of bilateral military agreements. This model also creates openings for follow-on cooperation – such as training, maintenance, and future upgrades – tying Chad more closely to Chinese military systems and supply chains. For China, this represents one of its first direct arms footprints in central Africa, albeit facilitated by a Gulf intermediary.
What to watch out for
Chad’s new status as a Gulf–Sahel nexus means the stakes are high and dynamic. Key developments to monitor include:
- Sudan–Chad border: Any hostile incident (drone strike, militant infiltration, or civilian shelling) on the Chad side could quickly escalate. Sudan’s generals have already threatened Amdjarass and N’Djamena – if they follow through, it could pull Chad formally into the war.
- Economic deals: UAE-linked investment in Chad’s oil, minerals, or infrastructure could grow. Projects like an oil refinery or mining deals would tie Chad’s fortunes to Abu Dhabi.
- Regional alignments: Chad’s moves with Russia and the Sahelian AES alliance should be watched. If Chad abandons the balancing act with Russia and moves closer to the Kremlin, this could potentially lead to cooperation with or accession to the pro-Moscow, anti-Western Alliance of Sahelian States (AES).
- Turkey’s expanding military footprint: Ankara’s control of Abéché military base and equipment transfers may signal a long-term security presence. Turkey may deepen its security cooperation and leverages its presence for political or economic concessions.
- China’s entry point: Beijing’s arms delivery via the UAE may mark a new phase in China’s quiet strategic expansion into Chad. Watch out for further military materiel transfers, training, or surveillance support.
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(i) Africa’s 5th biggest country that you almost never see on the news | Express
(ii) Chad, the ‘last Western domino’ in the Sahel – for how long? | Le Monde
(iii) UAE accused of fuelling Sudan war as UN tracks dozens of military cargo flights | The New Arab
(iv) UN report ties UAE to Sudan war via Chad airbridge | The New Arab
(v) UAE airbridge allegedly used to funnel arms to Sudanese conflict | Sudan Tribune
(vi) How the UAE is allegedly fuelling Sudan’s conflict | BBC News
(vii) Chad and the UAE partner with Etihad Rail for Chad-Cameroon railway project | Cameroon Online
(viii) UAE, Chad discuss economic and security cooperation | UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(ix) Chad’s development plan targets $30 billion over 6 years, finance minister says | Reuters
(x) Russian foreign minister wraps Africa tour with working visit in Chad | Africanews
(xi) Arrest of Russian in Chad lifts veil on continental influence operation | Africa Defense Forum
(xii) Chad’s internal crackdown raises human rights concerns | BBC News
(xiii) Chad extends detention of RFI journalist as lawyers denounce crackdown | RFI
(xiv) Africa File: French influence in Africa erodes further, Syria’s impact | Institute for the Study of War
(xv) Turkey takes control of Abéché military base in Chad | Military Africa
(xvi) Turkey expands military influence in Chad, replacing France in strategic Sahel shift | Pioneer News Today
(xvii) Turkey takes control of Abéché military base in Chad | Military Africa
(xviii) Shifting regional alliances and Turkey’s control of key military bases in Chad | The Cable
(xix) Chad receives Chinese-made air defense systems | The Defense Post
(xx) Chad receives Chinese-made air defense systems as UAE expands African role | Business Insider Africa
(xxi) Chad receives Chinese mobile air defense systems from UAE | The Defense Post
Figure 1: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Foreign_Secretary_David_Lammy_meets_Sudanese_refugees_in_Chad_in_the_border_town_of_Adre_on_24_January_2025_-_14.jpg
Figure 2: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Place_de_la_nation_%28Tchad%29.jpg
Figure 3: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Guelta_d%E2%80%99Arche%C3%AF,_Chad.jpg